

What Happens to Social Movements When They Succeed

The Case of the 4 Percent for Education in the Dominican Republic

by
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A political opportunity structure that emerged in the Dominican Republic between 2009 and 2012 facilitated the victory of a movement that forced the government to begin spending 4 percent of the gross domestic product on preuniversity education, but the movement was unable to develop a social base that would ensure the effective implementation of its demand. This case suggests that a movement's success in reaching its formal goal is just the first stage in a struggle whose second stage is continued pressure on the state to ensure that demands are implemented.

La estructura de oportunidad política surgida en la República Dominicana entre 2009 y 2012 facilitó la victoria de un movimiento que obligó al gobierno a comenzar a gastar el 4 por ciento del producto interno bruto en la educación preuniversitaria. Sin embargo, dicho movimiento no pudo desarrollar una base social que asegurara la implementación efectiva de sus demandas. Este caso sugiere que el éxito de un movimiento en torno al cumplimiento formal de sus metas es sólo la primera etapa en una lucha cuya segunda etapa exige presión continua sobre el estado para asegurar que se implementen los cambios deseados.

Keywords: *Political opportunity structure, Social movements, NGOs, Social base*

This article is a case study of a social movement that emerged in the Dominican Republic between 2009 and 2012 organized around demands that the government enforce Law 66-97, which had been passed by the Congress in 1997 but never implemented (Congreso Nacional, 1997). Although the movement was moderately successful and the government began to enforce the law in 2013, the implementation of the latter was fraught with difficulties. The article uses the framework of the political opportunity structure to explain the movement's relative success. A contradictory dynamic emerged after the state agreed to implement the demands—a significant reduction of the movement and the effective control of the implementation process by the private sector and the Catholic Church. In what follows I argue that this development may be the result of contradictory goals among the movement's leaders and its allies

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and the inability of the movement to build a social base that would exert pressure on the state and ensure the full implementation of its demands.

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Political opportunity structure theory proposes that timing and institutional arrangements are fundamental for social movements to succeed. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2003) have observed that social movement theoretical approaches have focused on why movements emerged—why middle-class actors organized into “new social movements” as opposed to labor unions formed around the working class (Melucci, 1980; Touraine, 1987). Other approaches have examined the resources that social actors mobilized—how they organized claim making (Snow, Soule, and Kriesi, 2005). McAdam and Tilly argue that these theories do not take into account the development of the political opportunity structure that explains why movements emerge at a particular time and place. In particular, political opportunity structure theory seeks to explain why “movements sometimes gain surprising, but temporary, leverage against elites or authorities and then quickly lose it despite their best efforts. It also helps to understand how mobilization spreads from people with deep grievances and strong resources in very different circumstances” (Tarrow, 1994: 85–86). The political opportunity structure includes “(1) the multiplicity of independent centers of power within the movement, (2) its openness to new actors, (3) the instability of political alignments, (4) the instability of influential allies or supporters for challengers, (5) the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim making, and (6) decisive changes in items 1 to 5” (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007: 57). Social movements operate within a broad political regime and need to establish alliances with other political forces to achieve their goals. Social movement actors must identify political alignments and determine which political forces can be supporters or challengers. While a particular political conjuncture need not include all these structural factors, assessing them enables us to explain the political process and the place of a social movement within it.

Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 114) define a social movement in terms of its base and its campaign:

A social movement base consists of movement organizations, networks, participants, and the accumulated cultural artifacts, memories, and traditions that contribute to social movement campaigns.

A social movement campaign is a sustained challenge to power holders, in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders, by means of concerted public displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment, using such means as public meetings, demonstrations, petitions, and press releases.

Collective action is always contentious. It presents a diversity of claims to authorities. As claim makers, social movements are interested in concrete issues and generally tend to work within the system rather than seeking to overthrow

it. They broaden and strengthen citizenship rights (Marshall, 1964; Turner and Isin, 2002). However, citizenship remains a source of conflict because the political regime formally recognizes those rights but the capitalist system undermines their implementation. Neoliberal economic policies strengthen the power of private capital, especially the international capitalist forces, to intensify and advance the globalization process. In Latin America, where the implementation of neoliberal reforms has deepened social inequality and shrunk the middle class, citizenship rights are not a priority for the neoliberal state.

The state provides a framework for the interaction between social movements and public authorities and grants citizenship rights, but it is not always “competent, purposive, coherent, and capable” (Yashar, 2005: 6). The state institutions in charge of delivering social services in Latin America are typically weak and poorly structured. This situation has deteriorated over the past 40 years as the state has lost its capacity to formulate socioeconomic policies to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other multilateral financial institutions (Franco, 1994: 50–61). While liberal democracy promises civil and political rights and justice and equality before the law, these principles are weak in the face of the capacity of capitalists to exploit workers and are therefore always subject to reversal and denial. This is particularly so in contemporary neoliberal states, where the main objective is to promote the development of market societies and liberal democracy. Nonetheless, in Latin America social movements have used the spaces opened by liberal democracy to protest and resist neoliberalism, seeking to strengthen citizenship rights.

The 4 Percent Movement in the Dominican Republic is an example of these processes. In the following pages I will examine why this movement was comparatively successful. I will analyze the role of the *Coalición por una Educación Digna* (Coalition for a Dignified Education—CED) and its relationship with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and show that it failed to build a social base that could exert pressure on the state to ensure the enforcement of the law and thus contributed to a partial privatization of the 4 percent.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF EARLIER SOCIAL PROTESTS

From the late 1970s to the beginning of the 1990s, Dominican society experienced a cycle of anti-neoliberal protests including a national uprising in 1984, regional and nationwide strikes, and local protests led by labor unions and grassroots organizations (Betances, 2015). Despite the strength and capacity to paralyze the nation of these protests, the capitalist state and the bourgeoisie had control over the political situation. The attempts of the Catholic Church to mediate between labor, business, and the state excluded grassroots organizations on the pretext that their lack of formal recognition made them unrepresentative. These movements nevertheless led several impressive strikes, but they were unable to gain much from a state that had the full support of capital and the Church (Betances, 2016: 413–515). Church mediation in the 1980s drove a wedge between labor and the grassroots movement, allowing the state to disregard social demands (Betances, 2007: 143–176). As a consequence, neoliberal policies were implemented throughout the 1990s and the first two decades of the twenty-first century, leading to an intensification of social inequality.

There are many explanations for the failure of earlier social movements (Betances, 2016: 185–202), among them repression, the intervention of political parties of the left and the right, fragmentation of movement actors, and a lack of structured political opportunities. The Dominican state enjoyed the support of the IMF and the U.S. government and, at the local level, the private sector and the Church. Regardless of the ideology of the political party in office, all Dominican government leaders implemented neoliberal policies. However, the success of these policies had its limits. It increased social inequality to the point that members of the middle class were unable to send their children to private schools. The public schools were dilapidated, and high-school graduates were unable to perform adequately in their jobs. A growing public awareness of the state of the education system led to the emergence of a new social movement that was spearheaded by the middle class and had massive support. However, the protests that were launched might have met the same fate as previous movements had there not been pressure from abroad.

THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE, 2009–2012

The international and national political context created a political opportunity structure in the Dominican Republic. At the international level, the World Bank and various Latin American educational institutions urged the Dominican government to revise its budget for preuniversity education, which had fallen below the regional average of 4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). (The Dominican Republic had been investing around 2 percent of the GDP since 1999.) Based on inordinate executive authority, what the political scientist Guillermo O'Donnell called “delegative democracy”¹ had become consolidated, allowing for periodic elections while maintaining a minimum of respect for civil and political rights. In contrast to the situation in the 1980s and 1990s, citizens were no longer afraid to hold rallies to protest the government's disregard for their social demands. In this new context, there was increasing concern about the precarious state of preuniversity education, which was making it difficult to create a skilled workforce. President Leonel Fernández (2004–2012) became increasingly isolated, since most political actors favored an increase in the budget for preuniversity education. This political conjuncture created opportunities for the rise of new actors who could ally themselves with influential elites such as the private sector, the Church, and the NGOs.

The 4 Percent Movement had its origin in the Asociación Dominicana de Profesores (Dominican Teachers' Union—ADP), which had long advocated enforcement of Law 66-97, requiring an investment of 4 percent of the GDP in preuniversity education. At the end of 2006, María Teresa Cabrera, a socialist and president of the ADP, established the 4 percent as the union's main demand, but when her term ended she was not reelected. A progovernment faction took control of the union and ceased the campaign for enforcement of the law. Cabrera then took her campaign out of the union and succeeded in building the CED, which assembled the Church, universities, cultural associations, professional associations, Evangelical churches, private foundations, labor unions,

grassroots organizations, and NGOs. A cross-section of Dominican society, its members included 135 nationally recognized entities that considered the education system in desperate need of profound reform. A new political conjuncture had emerged that enabled the CED to accumulate resources. The Fernández administration refused to increase the budget for education. Ninety-one percent of the population supported the movement, and the media constantly covered the events of the CED, which rapidly proceeded to set up small committees (Edujesuit, 2016). Labor and grassroots organizations, private foundations, and NGOs provided office space for meetings and equipment to facilitate communication and handled lobbying, communication, analysis, mobilization, fund-raising, and legal issues. The CED coordinating committee promoted a direct democracy that guaranteed all members full participation (Foro Socio-educativo, 2015: 53–58).

Middle-class professionals played a crucial role in the work of the CED committees by using their contacts in the media and their own organizations to build nationwide support. In the fall of 2010, the mobilization committees began to organize small protests in strategic places in the city of Santo Domingo. In November 2010, a protest near the National Palace was widely covered by the media, raising awareness of the police's treatment of protesters. The Jesuit Mario Serrano, director of the Bonó Center, wrestled with a policeman who wanted to take away his yellow umbrella. (Yellow umbrellas had emerged as the logo of the CED, and activists displayed them during demonstrations.) Mario Bergés of the Pope John XXIII Center and Patricia Gómez of the Committee for the Defense of Neighborhood Rights also grappled with a policeman. Media coverage increased the popularity of the movement.

In December the CED took its case to court and won (Mario Bergés, interview, Santo Domingo, July 19, 2016). Following the decision, the CED felt empowered and called for demonstrations on "Yellow Mondays." People were encouraged to wear something yellow to show their support for the campaign. CED mobilization committees also staged small demonstrations on strategic street corners and in parks in Santo Domingo, Santiago, San Francisco de Macoris, and other towns. They ensured that television cameras were present to report on demonstrations large and small. They also organized a social media strategy, making sure that whatever activity occurred was reported on Facebook and Twitter. The constant presence in both mainstream and social media created the perception that the 4 Percent Movement was larger than it was (Juan Bolívar Díaz Santana, interview, Santo Domingo, November 26, 2016). This strategy, though successful, was insufficient to ensure that the movement's demands were not distorted or poorly implemented. The CED failed to create a social base that would exert pressure on the government after the goal had been reached. Only a small group of NGOs continued to conduct inspections of school construction and participated in the debates on the implementation of the education budget, and even this participation was short-lived.

Building a social movement base is an arduous process that takes years of work. Social movement actors have to construct local organizations and link them at both the regional and the national level. They have to accumulate cultural artifacts, build memories, and create traditions. The CED had a short lifespan (about four years), too little time to build a strong local social base outside

the organizations that supported its campaign. These organizations had their own missions, and the promotion of grassroots organization was not among them. Their support for the 4 Percent Movement was a circumstantial and transactional phenomenon. Ironically, the relative success of the CED militated against the construction of a social base among popular organizations such as labor unions and grassroots organizations, which had been in decline since the 1990s (Betances, 2016: 523–575). There had not been much of a social movement to speak of until the CED emerged. What was remarkable about the 4 Percent Movement was that it took advantage of a political opportunity to raise the banner of education as a social right, demanding the enforcement of the law and contributing to the battle for democratization.

THE CED AND HIGH-POWERED POLITICS

The CED received support from business entities that helped pay the cost of concerts and activities that were attended by thousands without police interference. Families felt comfortable taking their children to these events. The famous Dominican singer Juan Luis Guerra, returning from a major world tour, had his band wear yellow T-shirts to announce their support for the education campaign (Juan Corporán, interview, Santo Domingo, July 21, 2016). In addition, CED committees lobbied Congress intensely and met with President Fernández, who, under pressure, in 2012, raised the education budget from 2.6 to 2.7 percent of the GDP (Magda Pepén, interview, Santo Domingo, July 13, 2016). However, this small increase was not nearly enough.

The social conditions of the majority of the population had worsened after years of neoliberal economic policies, which had been launched in the 1980s and continued through the following three decades. Public schools deteriorated, and citizens bore the brunt of the budget cuts. For example, in 2010 the Attali report indicated that “citizens had to spend more than two-thirds of their education expenditure on registration and tuition” (Attali, 2010: 30). In 2008, the government recognized that 216,000 children and adolescents—8 percent of children between ages 5 and 18—did not attend school (Ministerio de Economía, 2010: 57). The neoliberal state was not doing enough to train the workforce, an issue of concern for the private sector. Government investment in education was among the lowest in Latin America. In 1999 the government spent 2.83 percent, a figure that dropped to 1.3 percent in 2004 because of the 2003 economic crisis. Increases in budget allocations from 2004 on were insignificant—from 1.56 percent in 2005 to 1.85 percent in 2010 and 2.54 percent in 2012. From 1999 to 2012, the accumulated debt in education amounted to RD\$353,379.4 million (Observatorio del Presupuesto en Educación, 2013). There were not enough school buildings to accommodate the students, the buildings that existed were in poor condition, and teacher salaries were extremely low. In the meantime, President Fernández kept rejecting the 4 percent demand, arguing that it was based on a “false debate” because improving education was not just a matter of investing but one of managing the budget intelligently. Critics acknowledged this but countered that financial resources were an indispensable part of the equation (Gloria

Amézquita, interview, Santo Domingo, June 15, 2016). In his steadfast opposition to the budget increase, Fernández was acting in line with the neoliberal strategy of rolling back the social borders of the state. Aware that the Fernández administration did not consider education a priority, the CED took its message to the candidates for president in 2012. It asked each of them to sign the Political and Social Commitment to Education, agreeing to enforce the Organic Law of Education, which required 4 percent of the GDP to be invested in preuniversity education (CED, 2011). Danilo Medina won the election and, once in office, instructed the minister of education, Carlos Alberto Amarante Baret, to spend the 4 percent of GDP on education in 2013. The next challenge was to guarantee that the Ministry of Education would follow through on the government's promises.

THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 4 PERCENT

The Ministry of Education faced formidable challenges when the 4 percent was authorized. It had to develop a plan not only to repair classrooms but also to build new ones in response to the national demand of a population that could no longer pay the high tuition of private schools. The ministry developed five priorities for responding to the conditions of the school system: (1) institutional modernization, (2) development of the teaching profession by introducing a new scheme of education, recruitment, and salaries, (3) extension of the school day from four to eight hours, (4) elimination of illiteracy and provision of channels to guarantee the continuation of the learning process, reducing current levels of exclusion, and (5) construction and repair of school buildings at the preschool and elementary and middle school levels (Observatorio del Presupuesto en Educación, 2013: 6; Andrea Gallina, interview, Santo Domingo, June 23, 2016).

The institutional modernization of the school system involved technical, administrative, and pedagogical issues. The leadership of the ministry considered teacher training an important priority but concentrated on extending the school day, building and repairing classrooms, eliminating illiteracy, and providing support to students living in vulnerable social conditions. In fact, the extended school day program had begun in 2011–2012 with a small number of students and by 2016 included over 50 percent of public school students (*Hoy*, 2016). However, implementing the extended school day required the Ministry of Education to hire 18,103 new teachers between December 2011 and August 2015, a 27 percent increase that raised the total to 84,041. The ministry also expanded administrative personnel by 85 percent—adding 33,110 people to the governmental bureaucracy in a short period and incurring criticism that much of this increase was unnecessary. The fact that cleaning and security staff increased by 52 percent (11,144 persons) suggested to many that these were jobs created for sympathizers of the ruling Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (Dominican Liberation Party—PLD) (Jenny Torres, interview, Santo Domingo, July 21, 2016; EDUCA, 2016: 56, 123).

The extension of the school day ran into multiple difficulties because of delays in the construction and repair of classrooms. For the period 2013–2016, the government planned to build 28,000 classrooms, increasing the number to 63,000 nationwide, and to repair 23,130. However, in 2015 it had only built 12,861 classrooms and repairs were behind schedule (*Observatorio del Presupuesto en Educación*, 2016: 4). The delays in construction were due to difficulties in finding spaces for the construction of school buildings in densely populated urban areas, political favoritism in the purchase of properties for the purpose, contractors' selling their contracts to others, and significant changes in plans. The Office of Engineers for Supervising Public Works and the Ministry of Public Works and Communication were given the responsibility of overseeing the national school construction program, but soon afterward a major corruption scandal surfaced in the agency. In September 2015 David Rodríguez García, an architect with a contract to build a school, committed suicide in one of its bathrooms, leaving a note in which he named people who were running an extortion scheme. Evidence presented in court demonstrated that personnel of the Office of Engineers overpriced public works and retained payments meant for contractors, who were then forced to borrow money from the agency to finish their work. *Poder Ciudadano* (Citizen Power) and other groups outraged by the delays organized protests in front of the agency (Pimentel, 2015; *El Informador.net*, 2015). This caused an outcry, forcing the president to reconsider the role of the Office of Engineers in supervising public school construction. In December 2016 he issued Decrees 367-16 and 348-16 transferring the agency's duties to the Ministry of Public Works and Communications. This placed the Ministry of Education in charge of authorizing and coordinating the places and plans for building public schools (Peguero, 2016). The protests of *Poder Ciudadano* demonstrated that bringing political pressure to bear on authorities is necessary to ensure that rights are recognized.

Much has been said about the success of the Medina administration in rebuilding public schools and establishing national literacy plans, preschool programs, and school lunch programs for impoverished working-class families, but the state's decision to implement the 4 percent for education was consistent with its defense and protection of the rights of capital to exploit labor. In fact, EDUCA and the Catholic Church had joined the ADP and various other social entities since the early 1990s in demanding more investment in preuniversity education. By carrying out its duties, the Ministry of Education made an important contribution to the training of a workforce needed for the advance of capitalism.

THE CED AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 4 PERCENT

The implementation of the 4 percent also presented a challenge for the CED. After President Medina committed to investing in education, the movement nearly disappeared, because most of the civic organizations involved believed that it was the government's responsibility to enforce the law. Nonetheless, Cabrera and a small group of NGOs organized two regional inspections of school constructions to ensure compliance with good building practices and presented two reports to the Ministry of Education. The Ministry welcomed these reports and promised to follow up on them, but its efforts

were discontinued because of lack of resources (María Teresa Cabrera, interview, June 20, 2016).

The question remains why the CED was unable to strengthen its social base. When Cabrera took her campaign for the 4 percent out of the ADP, she enlisted the support of NGOs that became her main support base. Many of the most committed middle-class professionals came from NGOs that were paid to engage in social issues, among them Ciudad Alternativa (Alternative City), the Pope John XXIII Center, the Bonó Center, the Dominican Council for the Defense of the Rights of Education Workers, the Juan Pablo Duarte political current of the ADP, and, significantly, the Foro Socio-educativo (Socio-educational Forum), an entity linked to EDUCA (EDUCA, 2014). All these organizations received funding from both local and foreign sources. While some might qualify as progressive, they were, ultimately, heavily invested in the implementation of neoliberal policies designed to strengthen market societies and liberal democracy (Pearce, 2010; Petras, 1997). This explains why, when the government called for meetings to discuss the National Pact for the Reform of Education in the Dominican Republic, a handful of NGOs conveniently filled the vacuum left by the CED, participating in the debates alongside EDUCA (Ministerio de Educación, 2014; Darwin Caraballo, interview, Santo Domingo, June 16, 2016).

Undeniably, the CED took an important step in the formation of a social movement by making use of both mainstream media and digital platforms to raise awareness of a social cause. However, as noted by Carlos Vilas, getting a demand accepted is just the first step toward seeing it implemented. Guaranteeing fulfillment requires routine follow-up and political pressure (Castrono, 2011). The CED was not prepared to move on to the second stage because its organizations were not equipped to organize a grassroots movement that would challenge the neoliberal state to fully implement its demands. The middle-class professionals that participated in the CED's committees returned to their duties in their respective NGOs (Rafael Jovine, interview, Santo Domingo, June 12, 2016; Juan Corporán, interview, Santo Domingo, July 21, 2016). When the government accepted the 4 percent demand, their mission had been accomplished.

The lesson of this episode of struggle is applicable to social movements all over Latin America: social movement actors must draw the line between themselves and most NGOs, whose objectives are framed within the neoliberal pattern. Many of these entities are created to broaden the reach of private capital into social spaces and undermine the strength of the popular classes. Social movement activists must also preserve their autonomy vis-à-vis the state and political parties (Ellner, 1994; Vergara-Camus, 2013). The NGOs and other civic organizations that supported the CED may support a particular campaign, but progressive NGOs can only go so far in the struggle to promote justice and social rights. If the struggle conflicts with the interests of capital, NGOs tend to withdraw from it. The labor/capital divide remains the main source of conflict.

CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN EDUCATION

EDUCA and the Church aimed to privatize a significant segment of the 4 percent for education. Whereas the CED called for an education that would

include every student and understood that it could not be achieved without increasing financial resources, the private sector had established EDUCA in 1989 to promote its own vision. According to EDUCA's (2014: 25) guidelines,

It is necessary to transform the curriculum of secondary schools and the technical and technological capacity the country has to offer. Businesses have difficulties finding high school graduates with the technical and technological skills needed to do a job. The gap that exists between skills and knowledge and the labor market generates distortions that can be observed in the high rates of unemployment among young people. . . . This transformation must take place within a framework of cooperation between the public and private sectors. . . . Private enterprises should be involved in defining the school curriculum, reconceptualizing educational programs, and communicating the benefits of a quality technical education to the families, the students, and the actors of the private sector.

In the preliminary discussions for the National Pact for Education, EDUCA played a leading role, participating in all of the fora, conducting all of the studies for the extension of the school day, and supporting the Foro Socio-educativo in monitoring the education budget through periodic publications. In short, for the business community, "EDUCA has represented the voice of the private sector in this space, and it plans to develop a leading role in monitoring and supervising the fulfillment of each and every one of the pacts agreed to by different sectors" (EDUCA, 2014: 67). Its director, Darwin Caraballo, appears frequently on news programs shaping public opinion on education and supporting the government's so-called Revolution in Education. EDUCA is interested not in running schools² but in shaping the type of education that will be available to students—following up on government programs and providing information. Its 2016 publication *Calidad del gasto educativo en la República Dominicana* seeks to promote educational programs that will ensure the production of a skilled workforce. It praises the government's so-called Revolution in Education but also criticizes its lack of effectiveness in constructing and repairing classrooms, paying teachers' salaries, and providing sustainable retirement programs. In addition, it raises questions about the artificial creation of employment for government sympathizers.

What is notable about EDUCA's view of education is that it appropriates publicly funded education for the benefit of the economic sector. Its objective is not to gain direct profit from managing schools but to raise the general level of education conceived as a means of increasing technical and technological capacities. EDUCA calls for a public-private partnership, but in practice its program would have the Ministry of Education working for the private sector to guarantee the latter's access to a skilled workforce. In short, this is a very subtle way of partially privatizing the 4 percent while presenting this as for the common good. EDUCA's work as a representative of the business community limits the capacity of the state to create an education system that recognizes the right of citizens to a critical and well-rounded education, one that goes beyond the training of a workforce to broadening citizens' cultural, historical, social, scientific, and civic horizons. That a broadly educated citizenry would enhance democracy does not seem to figure in EDUCA's concept of education.

In contrast to EDUCA, the Church offers school programs and therefore does seek tangible benefits from the implementation of the 4 percent law. For example, on December 10, 2015, it signed an agreement with the Ministry of Education of which Article 1 (Ministerio de Educación and Conferencia del Episcopado Dominicano, 2015) says that Catholic schools that agree to participate in the public system will function with the same characteristics as the public education centers, both in administrative and pedagogical aspects. They will also operate under the premise that education must be public and free, but with the added value of the Catholic ethic, which provides an education based on the values of the Gospel of Jesus Christ and the moral and official doctrine of the Catholic Church.

Article 3 of the agreement leaves no doubt as to what the Church will receive from its agreement with the state, saying that the ministry (1) recognizes the dioceses and other church institutions as responsible for the administration of education centers; (2) respects the Church's philosophy of education; (3) will pay the salaries of administrative, teaching, and support staff, who will have the same benefits and obligations as the employees of the ministry; (4) will include Catholic schools in its plans for training teachers and administrative personnel; (5) will execute the agreed-upon transfers and subsidies; and (6) will pay the salaries of all teaching, administrative, and support staff according to the specifications of the Operating Handbook of Public Education Centers. This agreement deepens the church-state relationship that has existed since the founding of the Republic in 1844. Except for a brief period during the Ulises Heureaux dictatorship (1886–1899), the state has always partially funded Catholic education programs. State policies concerning these programs were expanded and consolidated during the Rafael Trujillo dictatorship (1930–1961). Throughout this period, the state established state-funded educational institutions and agreed to have the Church manage them. This type of relationship continued after the fall of Trujillo in 1961, and since then all governments have financially supported not only Catholic schools but the Church as a whole (Betances, 2007: 143–176).

What is new about the agreement of 2015 is that the Ministry of Education ignores the National Pact for the Reform of Education, which mandates that all teaching, administrative, and technical personnel be selected through competitive and open procedures. Article 4.1 states that "teaching or administrative positions occupied by priests, deacons, or members of a religious institution may be filled without a competitive and open search." Similarly, Article 4.3 states that, if necessary, teaching or administrative staff will be selected by the director of the Catholic educational institution and presented to the Ministry of Education through the Ministry/Dominican Conference of Bishops. The agreement not only openly privatizes portions of the 4 percent for education but also continues a tradition whereby the Church educates as it sees fit rather than according to the constitution, which states that public education must be secular. As of July 6, 2017, 127 Catholic schools became publicly funded entities (*Listín Diario*, 2017).

Both EDUCA and the Church partake in the 4 percent and set the tone for public education, although in different ways. Government officials and politicians accept the invasion of the public domain by the private sector, limiting the possibilities for the development of a secular, critical, and well-rounded education. The so-called public-private partnership has implications for the construction of citizenship and democracy because EDUCA and the Church

have their own ways of viewing citizenship. For business, citizens are providers of labor power and consumers. The view of the Church is various, ranging from the confessional but critical education offered by the Jesuit program *Fe y Alegría* (Faith and Joy) to the more conservative position of the schools sponsored by dioceses and archdioceses. In contrast to the business approach of EDUCA, the Church is interested in the comprehensive development of the human being within a religious conception of reality. This confessional view distances it from the secularism of socialists, but dialogue remains possible; socialists are also concerned with the development of a critical and comprehensive viewpoint in education. Whatever the Church's perspective, however, its activities are framed within the neoliberal pattern and therefore part and parcel of local structures of power.

Cabrera (interview, Santo Domingo, June 20, 2016) wonders how government programs of education relate to the type of citizen and society they seek to form. What kind of human being do we want to educate? How are we going to educate citizens and what will they do with their education? What does EDUCA mean by "quality education"? For EDUCA, she says, "quality education is that which prepares a technically qualified workforce that is obedient and lacks the . . . perspective of critical thought." She believes that the state should not allow any particular institution, whether EDUCA or the Church, to determine the kind of education that citizens receive. From her point of view, the state has an important role to play in developing educational policy. The Ministry of Education must determine the educational priorities of society and citizens at both national and local levels. The social, economic, and cultural realities in which citizens live must be incorporated into the pedagogical programs used to train both teachers and students as active and critical citizens. This method is completely different from EDUCA's business approach.

As noted above, the ministry has focused on the construction and repair of classrooms, leaving teacher training for the future (Rafael Jovine, interview, Santo Domingo, June 12, 2016). The new minister of education, Andrés Navarro (2016–2020), has promised to make teacher training a priority, but rather than distancing the ministry from EDUCA and the Church he has embraced them. This means that Dominican schools will be geared toward serving the needs of capital and much less toward the critical education proposed by Cabrera and the middle-class professionals who participated in the 4 Percent Movement.

The dominant political, economic, and cultural institutions will always attempt to influence the implementation of the law to protect their interests. Socialists such as Cabrera can work within the system to gain certain citizenship rights, but state laws will always reflect class power in society. In fact, the Ministry of Education is an instrument of the capitalist state to exercise state power in a context in which the laws that protect the right of working people to an education are always subject to violation.

CONCLUSION

Political opportunity structure theory identifies timing and institutional arrangements as essential to the relative success of social movements. They

enable social movement leaders to take advantage of particular political conjunctures for leverage against and even support from the elite or authorities. This analysis of the interaction of these factors has shed light on the development of the 4 Percent for Education Movement, which assembled new actors interacting with the business sector, the Church, and the NGOs. During the first stage of the movement, the interests of these various actors appeared to coincide, but once the government agreed to implement their demands, serious contradictions developed between movement leaders, some of whom were socialists, and the institutions that provided them support. The promotion of neoliberalism of the Church and EDUCA and other NGOs was at odds with the thinking of the CED's key leaders. EDUCA was able to control the debates concerning the implementation of the 1997 education law because the CED no longer had protesters marching in the streets and thus exerting political pressure on the regime.

The CED nearly disbanded once President Medina agreed to the 4 percent assignment because most of the civic organizations that had supported the battle thought that it was over. The movement was a victim of its own success in that it had not had time to accumulate the cultural artifacts, memories, and traditions that are essential for sustaining a social movement in the long term. In addition, the groups that made up the CED were socially and politically heterogeneous, and this had made it difficult to develop common ideological ties. In fact, the CED is typical of social movements that lack a broader ideological understanding or commitment and thus become obsolete once their immediate objectives are apparently achieved. This is a fundamental dilemma faced by social movements in contrast to political parties. Notwithstanding this weakness, the CED did take advantage of a structured political opportunity to force a neoliberal government to begin funding preuniversity education as the law required.

NOTES

1. "Delegative democracy rests on the premise that whoever wins the elections to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office. The president is considered the embodiment of the nation and the main custodian and definer of its interests. The policies of his government need bear no resemblance to the promises of his campaign—has the president not been authorized to govern as he (or she) thinks best?" (O'Donnell, 1994: 59–60).

2. EDUCA was not the only business initiative involved in education issues. INICIA, a foundation linked to the prominent Vicini family, also participated in the debates. However, INICIA was interested in establishing a public-private partnership to run preschools. The government would construct the buildings, maintain them, and pay the teachers, and a private entity such as INICIA would administer them on the state's behalf. Those involved in the partnerships would have to follow the guidelines of the Ministry of Education concerning education policy. Currently, public schools only cover around 30 percent of preschool children. It is not yet clear how INICIA or any other NGO interested in this business would operate and how much it would profit (Rafael Jovine, interview, Santo Domingo, June 12, 2016). To my knowledge, no agreement between the Ministry of Education and INICIA has been made public. I was unable to interview anyone at INICIA during the summer of 2016 to discuss the issue. Future researchers will need to examine the nature of public-private partnerships in education and what is at stake for both the private and the public sector.

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